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Katrina and the Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)

Just poking around on the internet.

I went to the Center for Army Lessons Learned at http://call.army.mil/.

I was looking for lessons learned on emergency communications systems.  I recall a few years ago when I was a Medical Service Corps officer that I had found some great stuff there.  We had had a MASCAL drill in the MTF (Medical Treatment Facility) and I was working in the PTMS Office (Plans, Traning, Mobilization, and Something), which is the Operations shop for the MTF.  As is not unusual in these types of drills, it was a complete conjugal cluster.  I'll try to find that commo stuff later, but I wanted everyone(both of you who read this blog!) to know that they have a page up already on Katrina lessons learned with many links and .ppt briefings for different units.

This page, http://call.army.mil/katrina/disaster_relief/lessons.asp, links to a .ppt presentation entitled "FEMA in disaster relief"  It's not clear if the .ppt was developed for Katrina or an earlier hurricane., it's pretty generic and the timeline on the last slide doesn't match Katrina.

Slide 1 covers FEMA roles/missions.

Slide 2 has the organizational chart for the regional FEMA operation.

Slide 4 discusses commander intent for DoD support to FEMA.

Slide 6 is a list of which federal agency is performing which Emergency Support Functions.

Slide 7 is matrix that appears to flesh out slide 6.

If you're curious about the nuts and bolts of FEMA and disaster relief, you might find the slide show interesting.

First post-mortem of the NO Emergency Communications System - Part 2

Gotta share some more:

"New Orleans had an emergency communications plan, but it had serious flaws.  The back-up communications of the city's Office of Emergency Preparedness consisted of a few older model satellite phones, but their batteries went dead and couldn't be recharged, Mr. Meffert says.

In the early stages of the storm, the city's emergency command office, on the ninth floor of city hall, got power from an emergency diesel generator.  But by the time the hurricane passed, it had burned up about one third of its fuel.  Fuel soon ran out completely and couldn't be repleninshed. 

Meantime, the commercial phone system that the city relied on blinked out during the storm adn its immediate aftermath, according to Mr. Meffert.  Land lines went dead in part because of switch and power failures, and city-issued cell phones stopped working after towers were blown down, he says. [emph added]  BellSouth Corp. says its nearby telecom hub was operative throughout the crisis."

[snip]

"Toward the end of last week, the 'cavalary' began arriving says Mr. Meffert, in the form of several thousand walkie-talkie phones provided by Sprint Nextel Corp.  The phones operate directly between users within short distances, so they do not require cell phone towers to transmit.  [Are these the Motorola Walk-abouts? or something else?]

At the same time, a team from computer supplier Unisys Corp. arrived, led by an ex-Army Ranger named Ed Minyard.  In addition to providing equipment to begin constructing a wireless network in the Hyatt and City Hall, Mr. Minyard brought some other supplies : bottles of Wild Turkey whiskey. 'We had the necessary provissions,' says Mr. Minyard.  'These boys needed it.'"

First post-mortem of the NO Emergency Communications System

Folks,

Today's WSJ has a must-read article about the communication difficulties faced by NO city hall officials.  I'm looking at the dead tree edition, I don't have a subscription. 

"Cut Off - At Center of Crisis, City Officials Faced Struggle to Keep in Touch; Mayor's Inner Circle Spent Two Days in the Dark; Web Phone Became Lifeline; Police Chief Rips a Server Free"

I'm going to type a few lines.  Read it all for full context.

"A command center set up before the storm stopped working when the backup generator ran out of diesel fuel.  Cell phone towers had been knocked out by high winds. [emph added]  Many land lines in the are were unusable.

When emergency power finally returned to the Hyatt, Scott Domke, a member of the city's technology team, remembered that he had recently set up an Internet phone account with Voage Holdings Corp.  He was able to find a working socket in a conference room and linked his laptop to an Internet connection.

At 12:27 a.m. on Wednesday, Aug. 31, the mayor's inner circle made its first outside calls in two days."  How the heck did he find an ISP signal?  That wasn't encrypted with a WEP key?

[snip]

"Over the next two days [after they had moved in to the Hyatt on Sat 8/27], what remained of the city government that had not evacuated before the storm - a core roup of about 15 people - steadily descended into information darkness."  Only 15 people to run the emergency operations of a stricken city?  Seems kind of low to me, but what do I know.

[snip]

"Mr. Meffert [NO's Chief Technology Officer and Deputy Mayor] says phone service went out at the Hyatt because of power failures and water damage tot he hotels mains switch.  After that, the Hyatt team's only available means of communications were police radios.  But those were operation at a fraction of capacity because the generator serving the main transmission site broke down.  Sometimes dozens of officers were trying to use one channel. 

For the most part, city officials relied on 'human chains of communication' he says.  'It was like: 'Go tell so-and-so if you see them.''

[snip]

Listen to this one folks, and ponder: "On Thursday, Mr. Meffert's team got word that 200 gang members were moving on the Hyatt, apparently aware that it still had food, drink, and power.  To signify that they were in the gang, members had made a distinguishing rip in their shirts, says Mr. Meffert. [snip]  Around 10 o'clock that morning, the team evacuated its fourt floor command post for the 27th floor.  The only equipment it brought along was a handful of cordless phones, which had a range of 300 feet.  On the 27th floor, where the mayor was staying, the phones worked only if the user hung over the balcony toward the atrium inside the building.

'This was when the last parts of the government were about to come undone,' says Mr. Meffert.  'It felt like the Alamo - we were surrounded and had only short bursts of communication.

With Police Chief Compass and others blocking the entrance, looters were not able to enter the Hyatt, Mr. Meffert says."

Think about this folks.  I don't know if there were 200 looters or not, but THE MAYOR'S OPERATION CENTER seemed to be legitimately in fear of being overrun.  Think of what the rest of the city must have been like.

There's lot's more great stuff to ponder.  I've probably already used too much, but read the rest yourself.

Here are some pictures of the Hyatt (hat tip: Some guy Jonah linked to)

http://www.kodakgallery.com/Slideshow.jsp?mode=fromshare&conn_speed=1&Uc=11f8dl9z.4nk5zpvf&Uy=vhxvcl&Ux=1

http://www.kodakgallery.com/Slideshow.jsp?mode=fromshare&conn_speed=1&Uc=11f8dl9z.4nk5zpvf&Uy=vhxvcl&Ux=1

Surging Law Enforcement forces to a region - The Municipal Guard

Update:  I'm breaking that post, Before We Lose Another American City, in to four separate posts so people can better comment on the ideas included.

My impression is that police agencies and officers do a good job supporting each other in crises.  I’ve read (but don’t have it here at my fingertips) that police officers from all over the country are in New Orleans and throughout the Gulf Coast helping local law enforcement.  My impression (admittedly ill-informed) is that this is pretty ad-hoc, although I believe that that there is already an interstate compact between about 40 states to provide emergency assistance to each other. 

I wonder if the arrival of such reinforcements could be accelerated by some prior planning and more structure?  Might it be time to create a police and fire rescuse Municipal Guard that is analogous to the National Guard?  An organized reserve corps of individual police officers and deputies who can volunteer to be activated and transferred to the affected state's jurisdiction?  Sure, it would be a motley crew with polyglot rescue equipment and communications system, but it may be better than nuthin’.

            

Police officers obviously differ from National Guardsmen.  Although both may be used for law enforcement, it is policemen who do this on a daily basis.  Police are better trained at law enforcement and have experience at using the minimum amount of force necessary to control an escalating situation.  Our Guardsmen, among the best-trained soldiers in the world, are trained primarily for war.  For understandable reasons, we generally don’t want soldiers, even Guardsmen, even Military Policemen, performing law enforcement.  Much better to have civil police do the job, if possible. 

Another big and obvious difference is that National Guardsmen are soldiers and police are civilians.  Soldiers can be ordered to go to places where they don’t want to go.  Civilians may usually decline.  So a Municipal Guard would require individual officers to volunteer, and it would require their police departments to allow them to go.

            If I were organizing this, I would create a Municipal Guard Bureau in DHS to fund and manage the program, maybe under DHS's Office for Domestic Preparedness (http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/).  I’m sure some smart Congressional staffers can figure it out.

            When disaster strikes, the Governor could ask the President for police reinforcement.  The DHS Municipal Guard Bureau would call the state Municipal Guard units for volunteers.  The volunteers would get permission to go from their police departments and then assemble at the designated area for movement to the requesting state.  If necessary, DoD could provide lift assistance.

            Volunteer Fire Departments in rural areas might provide strategic depth for fire and rescue services.  DHS would provide VFD’s with Municipal Guard money and training now, and the VFDs would also move to the assembly areas when needed.

            

Well, thems m’ thoughts at the moment.   These certainly aren’t all the answers, maybe not any of the answers.  But we’ve got to talk more about civic defense.  It seems to me that most governors would welcome the opportunity to call on hundreds, even thousand, of responsive state and local forces who could help in hours, not days.  For the system to work, all would have to voluntarily work hard together.  Based on these last two weeks, I think there is a widespread willingness to do so.  But we’ve got to get these systems and plans set up before the disaster strikes.  Organizing this in the middle of the disaster would be exponentially harder. 

UPDATE:  Changed some stuff.  Good thing no reads this blog but me.

Surging Law Enforcement forces to a region - Title 32 Quick Reaction Force

Update:  I'm breaking that post, Before We Lose Another American City, in to four separate posts so people can better comment on the ideas included.

We pay for a brigade of the 82^nd Airborne Division and a brigade of the 101^st Airborne Division (and others?) to sit around on strip alert and wait for a call from the President.  Why not pay for a couple of National Guard battalions to do the same?  I know what you’re thinking: the National Guard is already a quick reaction force.  They have armories all across the country.  Why would you try to bring in two battalions from far away?  Before I answer, let me finish describing the idea.  I admit that I haven’t examined Titles 10 and 32 to see if this is permitted or if legislative changes would be required.  I’m just thinking of how to augment state and local governments with state and local forces.

While the Guard is under the command of the Governor, they may support, and even conduct, law enforcement operations in a state, in addition to providing disaster relief services.  National Guard units are state organizations that operate under Title 32 of the U.S. code.  They are under the command and control of the state Adjutant General and the Governor until federalized by the President, whereupon they operate under Title 10.  Federal troops (either active duty, reserve, or federalized National Guard under Title 10) may not conduct law enforcement because of the Posse Comitatus Act.  (For the moment, I’m omitting any discussion of The Insurrection Act.  A short article on Posse Comitatus can be found here http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Trebilcock.htm)

The (DoD) National Guard Bureau should work with the 50 state governors to maintain two battalions of Title 32 National Guard on “active duty” to serve as a national domestic Quick Reaction Force.  These units would be on strip alert for 90 days in geographically strategic locations, one at, say, Fort Bragg, North Carolina and the other at, I don't know, Fort Carson, Colorado.  Their gear and vehicles would be packed up and sitting in a lock-in facility near the airfield, the Guardsmen training nearby.  The first elements of the units could be wheels up in two hours.  The Governor of the affected state could request these forces through the President, who would (through the chains) direct the National Guard Bureau to transfer the forces from the host state Adjutant General to the affected state's Adjutant General.  The Air Force, or even civilian CRAF aircraft would then deliver the forces in to the state… provided that you have a functional airfield at the other end.  (For information on the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, see http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=173) 

To keep them on strip alert, you'd need to have two additional battalions to rotate, so that one battalion would be reconstituting and training while the other is on alert.  I’m sure the National Guard Bureau and Army Human Resources Command (the old PERSCOM) would figure out how to create such battalions.

To answer those who ask why we would want to bring Guard forces from so far away, I would ask in reply, what if the armories are destroyed?  What if the road networks in to the region are impassable?  Air may be the only route into an affected region.  Mobilizing the Guard from neighboring states may not be quick enough.  As we’ve seen this past week, a Governor may need National Guard forces in hours, not days. 

Reestablishing Communications - Tactical Cellular Network

  Update:  [Will the font size be fixed?] I'm breaking that post, Before We Lose Another American City, in to four separate posts so people can better comment on the ideas included.

        If Uncle Sugar now threw a big chunk of change at the problem of immediately re-establishing communication networks in a devastated city, do you think our technical geniuses could come up with workable solutions that would work later?  I do.  What about blimps or huge weather balloons that carried cell tower equipment to replace the damaged cell towers?  How many would we need?  Would that work? I dunno.  I hope  DHS is paying some smart engineers to think about that.

            

For the purposes of this discussion, let's assume such a system could work.  Do you think that isolated survivors all over the area would appreciate being able to call or text message for help?  Now, you might ask, who would answer these tens of thousands of calls, all occurring at the same time?  Good question.  Again, I dunno.  Here's a thought: What if the calls were routed to distributed 911 Operators in participating call centers in the region, or even across the country.  The 911 operator would log the request for help into the DHS-funded computer system that interfaces with a NORTHCOM/FEMA/state/local operations fusion cell whose staffers sort and prioritize the requests.

            

What’s the best part about this plan?  No roaming charges!  Well, it might not be the best part of the plan (assuming such a plan were workable), but such a system would also give relief officials situational awareness, provided that you had enough people to aggregate and analyze the information.

            

At least one part of the federal government is already looking at tactical cellular networks.  The Army's Future Combat System is still on the drawing board, as are most of its communications components (Here’s a Global Security piece on the Warfighter Information System – Tactical http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/win-t.htm)  We need a more modest system that can be instantly erected for civil defense purposes.  Now. 

Questions to think about now, before the next American city is destroyed

Update:  I'm breaking that post, Before We Lose Another American City, in to four separate posts so people can better comment on the ideas included.

I'd planned to do a lot of poking around the DHS website, and posting additional volumes on what I found interesting, but I haven't had time yet today.  I hope to do more later.  I've read most of the DHS FY2004 Performance and Accountability Report and will post some of that material.  If I were a reporter writing the "What it all means" piece on the Katrina investigations, I might start there to understand the federal plan.

Questions to think about now, before the next American city is destroyed

The next time we lose an American city, we may lose it without advanced warning.  We may lose it before 80% of the city has had a chance to evacuate.  State and local officials may not have prepared, or they might be flat on their backs, or they might all be dead.  (BTW, does anybody know, do state governments and cities take Continuity of Operations [CoOp] seriously?  It’s deadly serious business at DoD.  What if the mayor and most of his staff are dead?  What if the Governor and his staff are incapacitated?  How often do governors and mayors flex their systems?  Is anyone, newspapers or other goo-goos, watching their preparations?)

This is now blindingly obvious to everyone, but if disaster relief must wait for a stable security environment, then a stable security environment must be maintained or immediately re-established because, as we have all witnessed, people cannot wait days for water, food, and rescue.  How do you do that?  How many other questions do you have to answer before you know that?  I’m sure that each of you has your own lists. Here’s mine:

How do you surge law enforcement and firemen and rescuers into a devastated city or region and integrate them in to a command and control network? 

I doubt that anyone has the answers, at least not yet. The ideas below are offered in hope that they would work within our existing federalist constitutional framework.  The police power resides with the states and their localities, not the federal government.  The federal government would provide its unique capabilities to assist states, but would not supplant the primary role of state and local governments.

They’re ideas to kick around, so kick away!

In short, how do you get tens of thousands of Guardsmen, police officers, firemen, medical personnel, civil engineers, utility repairmen, communication workers, ironworkers, federal troops, and skilled and unskilled volunteers to work together, quickly?

How do you reopen a damaged airfield?

How do you get the power back on? 

How do you open up the roads and stabilize the bridges and waterways? 

How do you re-establish a communications network (cellular?) in a devastated city?  How soon could you do it if you planned for and equipped for this contingency now?  48 hours?  24 hours?  12 hours?

Disaster Response Tactical Cellular Network - Prototype? Proof of Concept?

Thanks to Commentor BC, who linked to the Space Data Corporation in a thread below.

Anybody know anything more about these systems?  Could they be erected over a devastated city quickly?  Would they work?

I've inserted an image below.  I hope it comes out ok.  I also need to figure out hyperlinks.  I'm a new blogger folks, sorry!

http://www.spacedata.net/company.htm

About Space Data
Space Data’s mission is to enhance productivity by providing wireless services and solutions for industrial, business and consumer users in locations and geographies that are not served or are poorly served by existing wireless technologies and service providers.

The company has developed the SkySite^® Network, a balloon-borne wireless network based on ReFLEX™ technology, an industry standard protocol originally developed by Motorola. The SkySite Network can operate both on a standalone basis and as an extension of — and a complement to — existing terrestrial wireless networks. (emph added)

http://www.spacedata.net/technology.htm#

Overview of the SkySite Network
Space Data’s SkySite Network is a unique, aerial wireless data network that provides wide area data communications coverage using the ReFLEX 2.7 two-way packet data communications protocol.  It consists of a network of high-altitude, balloon-borne transceivers known as SkySite Platforms that are launched every 8 to 12 hours. Each SkySite Platform rises to an altitude of 60,000 to 100,000 feet. At that altitude, a coverage circle of 420 miles in diameter can be achieved, as shown in red on the diagram below.

SkySite Network Diagram

Poking around the DHS website Vol 2

I'm going to paste things that catch my eye.  I'll try not to pull them out of context, but obviously for full context, you should read the report yourself:

Page 8

"We continue to work aggressively to anticipate threats and develop and improve systems and technologies to protect against, counter and neutralize them. As such, this performance information helps us reassess and reprioritize resource requirements toward investments that have a demonstrable impact in mitigating the risks and threats to the Nation. We are continuing to link financial and performance information throughout the Department."

Poking around the DHS website Vol 1

Just poking around the DHS website...

The FY2004 Performance and Accountability Report (http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0430.xml) is interesting.

From the Executive Summary, page 6:

"Shortly after the Department was created in 2003, the Secretary established seven strategic goals to guide our priorities and inform our actions. These goals describe our role and responsibility to the Nation:

• Awareness – …

• Prevention – …

• Protection – …

• Response – Lead, manage and coordinate the national response to acts of terrorism, natural disasters or other emergencies.

• Recovery – Lead national, state, local and private-sector efforts to restore services and rebuild communities after acts of terrorism, natural disasters or other emergencies.

• Service – ….

• Organizational Excellence – ….

To accomplish its mission, the Department is organized into five directorates:

• The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate …

* The Border and Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate …

• The Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) Directorate ensures that the Nation is prepared for, and able to recover from, terrorist attacks and natural disasters;

• The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate …; and

• The Management Directorate …."

Page 7:

"In addition to the five major directorates, the Department includes other critical components:

• The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) …;

• The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) …;

• The Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP) serves as a single point of contact for facilitation and coordination of departmental programs that impact state, local, territorial and tribal governments.

• The Office of Inspector General (OIG) ….